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ABSTRACT 
Background: The novel coronavirus disease is an ongoing pandemic that started in China in 
December 2019. This paper is aimed at estimating the first two infections waves in Italy in 
relation to adopted health policies. 
Design and methods: We moved deaths of the Italian COVID-19 registry from recorded to 
2 
 
infection date by the weighted moving average. We considered two infection fatality ratios 
related to the effective or saturated health system, we estimated the likely incidence curve 
from the resulting deaths and evaluated the curve shape before and after the national health 
policies. 
Results. From the 24-th of February 2020 to the 7-th of February 2021 we estimated 
6,664,655 (4,639,221-9,325,138) cases distributed on two waves. Suitable daily infection 
fatality rates were 2.53% within the first wave and 1.15% within the second one. The first 
wave (February-July/2020) had its peak on the 14-th of March 2020 (26,575). The second 
wave (August/2020-February/2021) was fatter with the peak on the 12-th of November 
(60,425) and a hump in December before decreasing to 26,288 at the end. Adopted health 
policies were followed by changes in the curve rate.  
Conclusion: Tracing infection contacts and quarantining asymptomatic people reduced virus 
lethality in the second wave.  Restriction on population mobility is effective within a 
suppression strategy, distance learning reduces contacts among families. Removal of 
restrictions should be implemented by sequential steps for avoiding a quick rising of incident 
cases. A reasonable public health daily goal to control both virus spread and lethality could be 
to find at least 87 cases for each death. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is a new virus that 
emerged in December 2019 in Wuhan (China) [1]. The related spectrum of pathological 
manifestations is named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and usually ranges from mild 
flu symptoms to bilateral interstitial pneumonia [2]. Virulence and transmission features of 
SARS-CoV-2 pose two major challenges to health authorities to reduce mortality and avoid 
health system saturation. Firstly, despite the virus is not very aggressive in the whole 
population (about 1 death out of 100 infections in developed countries) [3-6], lethality 
increases with age (up to 10-15 deaths out of 100 infections in people aged more than 75 
years) and in people with concomitant comorbidities and/or patients who are 
immunosuppressed [7-9]. Since the prognosis of severe cases depends on the availability of 
intensive care beds, lethality also increases in periods with a saturated critical care capacity. 
Secondly, the virus can also spread through presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmissions 
(which are difficult to detect and isolate), hampering the efforts to lower hospital workload by 
reducing transmission chains in the population [10-13]. The percentage of asymptomatic 
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carriers is about 40% [14,15] and has a negative correlation with age [16-18]. Several studies 
suggested the need to consider asymptomatic infections by testing all contacts of confirmed 
cases, (including those without symptoms) and by dedicated reports in official statistics [19,20]. 
In Europe, COVID-19 spread started in Italy in February 2020. In the beginning, it was not 
clear the important role played by asymptomatic infections and diagnostic tests were 
performed above all on suspected cases with symptoms (except in the Veneto region) [15]. The 
virus hit very hard the country, with over 28,000 deaths in March-April/2020 (half of them 
concentrated in the Lombardy region). The governmental administration (following Chinese 
measures) established a national lockdown (the first in a democratic nation after the Second 
World War) for containing the virus spread. Schools were closed on the 5-th of March, one 
week later individual mobility other than health and work-related was limited to 200 meters 
around the home, and all non-essential industrial production was locked down from the last 
week of March. Restriction measures blocked the first wave and from May they were 
gradually removed in parallel with strong development of the COVID-19 contact tracing 
system. From August, the second wave started slowly (less than 1,500 detected cases and 15 
deaths per day for all the month) and was under control until September (the number of 
weekly detected cases grew linearly). From October, the virus spread started running faster 
(the number of weekly detected cases grew exponentially) and new restrictions were adopted. 
Data of the first wave were characterized by a case fatality ratio (CFR) 
                                 !"# =
!.#$	&'()*+	$,#-	)*'	.'/0!!0!/	)#	&()'
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very high compared to those of other countries. A comparative study ranked the most affected 
countries by CFR (evaluated on the 19-th of April) as follows: Italy (9.2%), the Netherlands 
(7.4%), Spain (6.0%), France (2.6%), China (2.3%), Switzerland (1.9%), South Korea (1.6%), 
USA (1.2%) and Germany (0.7%) [21]. Presumably, the large toll in Italy was at least in part 
explained by the number of undetected cases due to an ineffective contact tracing system until 
May-June/2020. A more accurate measure of lethality is the infection fatality rate (IFR) 
                                            %"# =
!.		#$	&'()*+	$,#-	)*'	.'/0!!0!/	)#	&()'
.		#$	0!$'1)0#!+	$,#-	)*'	.'/0!!0!/	)#	&()'	                                   
but it requires the knowledge of the true number of infections. To achieve this goal, the 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) performed a serological survey aimed at estimating the 
actual number of cases and found Coronavirus infection six times more prevalent than official 
data [14]. This result highlighted the importance to assess the true number of infections to 
evaluate both the virus lethality and spread correctly. By assuming different IFRs, this study is 
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aimed at estimating the daily incidence and lethality of Italian infections in relation to the 




This study analyzed publicly available data of Italian COVID-19 confirmed cases collected in 
the national registry by the Civil Protection (CP) and the National Health Institute (ISS).  
Settings 
On the 31th of January 2020, the Italian Government declared the health emergency status and 
delegated the CP to manage it. The CP established a data network (including all Italian 
regions) to collect COVID-19 data in a national registry (managed by the ISS) and publishes 
aggregate data about the virus spread updated day by day. 
 
Participants 
All Italian confirmed cases of COVID-19.  
Outcomes 
Primary outcomes were: 1) the number &2 of persons infected on the k-th day of pandemic 
(i.e., daily incident cases); 2) the number '2 of persons who died among &2 (i.e. number of 
deaths by day of infection); 3) the number ∆2 of persons who were officially detected among 
&2 (i.e., the number of diagnosed cases by day of infection). 
 
Data sources/measurement 
Aggregate data from the national COVID-19 registry are stored in a public repository and 
updated daily [22]. Data contain daily counts of diagnosed and lethal cases, of performed tests 
by region and refer to all people who tested positive to the polymerase chain reaction test or 




During an ongoing epidemic with many asymptomatic infections (like the COVID-19 
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pandemic), the number of diagnosed cases strongly depends on the related contact tracing 
system. For that reason, we estimated daily infections from resulting deaths. A reliable 
estimate of virus lethality in high-income countries is 1.15% [3], but it increases when the 
health system capacity is saturated. Since in Italy lethality is known (and higher than 
expectations) only over the first wave, for the second one we considered two scenarios: the 
first one is related to an overloaded health system (like in the first wave); the second one is 
related to a health system working below the saturation level (i.e., with lethality in line with 
expectations). We chose the scenario that was the most consistent with data, that is the one 
providing estimated daily infections &2 equal to or greater than the corresponding detected 
cases Δ2. 
 
IFR: lethality on the whole period 
Let *(4)and +(4) be respectively infections and deaths within the j-th age class over the whole 
pandemic period, the infection fatality ratio of the jth age class (%"#(4)) is equal to 
                                                                      %"#(4) =
6(")
7(")                                                             
and the overall IFR can be expressed as the weighted mean of %"#4s 




7,        with   * = ∑ *44  and + = ∑ +44 .          
Daily Infection Fatality Rate: lethality by day 
Let k be the number of elapsed days from 2020/02/24 (the earliest collected date), *8
(4)
 be the 
incidence within the j-th age class on k-th pandemic day and +8
(4)
 the related deaths among 
*8
(4)
. We define the daily infection fatality rate within the j-th age class (%"#8
(4)
) and the 
overall one (%"#8) as 













    with    %$ = ∑ %$(%)%     and   '$ = ∑ '$(%)% .     
We can note that IFR can be written as the weighted mean of %"#8 




7 ,   with     + = ∑ +88   
By defining the i-th wave of deaths (.0) as the i-th inverted U-shaped part of the related curve 
in a time-period /0 between two local minima /0 = [10:;, 10), we can similarly define the 
infection fatality ratio (%"#(.0)) of wave i as 
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,   with    +>. = ∑ +88∈=.    and   *>. = ∑ *88∈=. .   (1) 
Furthermore, we will say that a wave has a hump if after the peak it has two close inflection 
points.  
Estimating *8 
By assuming that the %"#8 does not change over time (%"#8 = %"#), through reliable 
estimates of %"# (95% CI: %"#4 - %"#5)	we can estimate *8 (with related 95% CI) as 
                                            *8 =
6,




?@AC).                                                     
(2) 
Similarly, by assuming that the %"#8 does not change within wave .0 (%"#8 = %"#(.0)), we 
can estimate *8 (with related 95% CI) within .0 as 
                                 *8 =
6,
?@A(>.)
  (95% CI: 6,?@AB(>.) – 
6,
?@AC(>.)
),         7 ∈ .0.                         
(3) 
Estimating +8 and Δ8    
Let 98,8E4 and :8,8E4 be the number of persons infected on k-th pandemic day who died or 
were diagnosed j days after the infection, the number of deaths (+8) and of detected cases 
(Δ	8) among infections on k-th pandemic day can be evaluated as 
+8 = ∑ 98,8E44       and         Δ8 = ∑ :8,8E44  
Since we only have the corresponding number of events by the occurrence date (of death or 
diagnosis) 
9∙,8E4 = ∑ 90,8E40      and       :∙,8E4 = ∑ :0,8E40  
we estimated +8 and Δ8 as 
                           +8 = ∑ ;4
(8E4)9∙,8E44            and 													Δ8 = ∑ <4





 are the fractions  









Let 	/&'(& and /&0(/! be respectively the time from infection to death and diagnosis and =8 
and :8 be the binary variables representing respectively the events to die (=8 = 1) or be alive 







 can be expressed as the conditional probability to die or be diagnosed j days 
after infection        
;4
(8E4) = @AB ≤ /&'(& < B + 1|=8E4 = 1G  and <4
(8E4) = @AB ≤ /&0(/! < B + 1|:8E4 = 1G.  
(5)               
The ISS provided estimated quartiles (H;, HH,	HI) of time distributions from symptoms to 
death and diagnosis in three different periods of occurrence (March-May, June-September, 




equal or close to zero, indicating that ISS estimates for time to death are admissible under 
symmetric distributions except in the summer period (strongly biased by clusters of 
vacationers [24]). We do not consider these biased estimates and only used estimates within 
remaining periods (which are equal each other, Table 1). We added 5 days (the mean time 
from infection to symptoms) [25] to ISS estimates to obtain corresponding parameters 




&M @{/&'(& < 1|=8 = 1}     and     I=5.789
(G,L;)(1) =
&
&M @A/&0(/! < 1|:8 = 1G.     
(6) 
If necessary, we adjusted for symmetry by replacing the median with the center of quartiles 
and assumed that functions in (6) follow the truncated normal distribution  
















.                 1 ∈ [0,2O] ,                           (7) 
where O and Q are the mean and standard deviation of the parent general normal probability 
with O =
J2EJ3
H  and Q =
J2:J3
;.IRSTU. We can note that the (4) with probabilities (5) derived from 
(7) can be also interpreted as a weighted moving average of period 2O + 1 on time series 
98E4 and :8E4 
                       +8 = ∑ ;4
(8E4)HV
4LW 98E4      and    Δ8 = ∑ <4
(8E4)HV
4LW :8E4.                            
 
Choosing appropriate %"#8s within waves 
We simulated two scenarios with different IFRs: %"#(1)= 2.53% (2.31-2.77%) and 
	%"#(2) = 1.15% (0.78-1.79%). The former is related to an overloaded health system and was 
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calculated at the end of the first wave (on July/2020) through the ISTAT serological survey; 
the latter is related to an effective health system and is (to date) one of the most reliable 
estimates of lethality for high-income countries [3]. Through the (1) we estimated *8 in both 
cases 









        with        *8(1)<*8(2) 
and studied the ratios #8(U) of detected cases ∆8 among estimated infections *8(U) on k-th 
day (Fig. 2) 
                                         #8(U) =
∆,
	*%(0)
            with                  i =1,2.                                  
If #8(U)>1 (i.e ∆8>'$(U)) then the assumed %"#(U) overestimated the actual %"#8 on the k-th 
pandemic day and the number of detected cases ∆8 for each death +8 (i.e., the ratio ∆8 +8⁄ ) 
was greater than  
;
?@A(D): 





?@A(0).                         (8) 
For the second wave .H, we chose the %"#(.H) with related estimates of *8 (7 ∈ .H) (3) 
most consistent with data. The (8) also provides a reliable cutoff for maintaining the daily rate 
%"#8 under a fixed threshold: at k-th day, we should find more than 87 cases for each death 
for having %"#8<1.15% and more than 40 cases for having %"#8<2.53% (figure 2). Finally, 
under the assumption of an effective health system (%"#=1.15%) and according to estimates 
in [3], the expected number of infections per death within age classes is shown in table 1 of 
supplemental material. 
 
Evaluating health policies 
We defined the mean weekly death curve rate as the difference between the number of deaths 
at the first and the last day of the week divided by 7. We evaluated health policies by 
calculating the relative difference of these rates between the week before and after the day 
when the policies come into effect (table 2). These relative differences are equal by 
construction to those of incidence cases of infections. Relative differences in the fraction of 




Data access and cleaning methods 
Data are open and can be downloaded in .csv format [22]. The region of Emilia-Romagna 
reported 154 deaths on the 15-th of August that refer to March, April, and May. We 
redistributed those deaths to the right months using the observed regional mortality 
distribution in that period. 
 
3. RESULTS 
During the first 350 days of the COVID-19 pandemic (from the 24th of February to the 7th of 
February 2021), Italy performed 34,362,726 tests, detected 2,639,972 cases, and recorded 
91,273 deaths. Infections were distributed on two waves, the first one lasted 157 days (from 
the 24th of February to the 29th of July 2020), the second one (from the 30th of July 2020 to the 
7th of February 2021) lasted 193 days. During the first wave, authorities detected 246,836 
cases and performed 6,690,311 tests, during the second one they detected 2,393,136 cases and 
performed 27,672,415 tests. The monthly amount of tests strongly increased from 488,307 in 
March 2020 to 6,068,119 in January 2021.   
 
Deaths by infection day 
The curve of deaths by day of infection increased up to 672 deaths on 14th of March 2020 (the 
peak), then decreased down to a minimum of 6 deaths on the 29-th of July 2020. The second 
wave started on the 30th of July, presented a peak of 695 deaths on the 12th of November 2020 
and a hump with about 480 deaths from the 16th to the 29th of December before decreasing 
down to 302 deaths on 7th  of February 2021 (figure 1). 
 
Lethality  
By considering the first scenario (%"#8(1)=2.53%) over the whole pandemic period, we 
obtain the ratio #8(1) greater than 1 from the 20-th of July to the 17-th of November 2020. 
By considering the second scenario (%"#8(2)= 1.15%) over the whole pandemic period we 
have the ratio #8(2) greater than 1 just from 08-th of August to the 5-th of September 2020 
(figure 2). To Keep data coherence, we assumed a daily infection fatality rate equal to 2.53% 
within the first wave (%"#8=2.53%, , ∈ .E) and 1.15% during the second one (%"#8=1.15%, 
	, ∈ .F). From the 21-th of June (the mid-date of the ISTAT survey) to the 30-th of July/2020 
(the end of the first death wave - figure 3), we assumed values of IFR decreasing smoothly 
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from %"#(.;) to %"#(.H).  
 
Incidence Curve of Infections 
The Curve of incident cases is presented in Figure 3 and shows 6,664,655 (4,639,221-
9,325,138) infections from the beginning to the 7-th of February 2021. The first wave had its 
peak of 26,575 new infections on the 14-th of March 2020 and ended within the last two 
weeks of July. The second wave started to grow slowly in august and increased faster from the 
last week of September onwards. It approached its first peak of 60,425 infections on the 12-th 
of November, was stable at about 41,500 between the 17-th and the 29-th of December, and 
finally decreased to 26,288 on the 7-th of February 2021.  
 
Health policies effects on estimated curves 
During the first wave, the average number of deaths in figure 1 had a relative reduction of 
49% after the school closure of the 5-th of March 2020, of 120% after the restriction to the 
mobility of the 12-th of March 2020, of 44% after the industrial production lockdown while it 
increased relatively of about 28% after allowing first intra-regional and later inter-regional 
mobility (table 2). During the second wave, the average number of deaths relatively increased 
by 143% after the first partial opening of schools (of 14 out of 20 regions) and of 110% after 
the second one (of remaining 6 regions). The first restriction to the mobility of 24-th of 
October 2020 was followed by a rate relative reduction of 15%, while the second one 
(2020/11/05) of 66%. Government-induced spending incentives for in-store Christmas 
shopping (cashback scheme) announced on the 8-th of December 2020 were followed by a 
rates relative increment of 54% and a change in the concavity of the curves (figures 1 and 3). 
After restrictions of the 20-th and of the 24-th of December weekly rates relatively decreased 
by 800% and continued to decrease after the relaxation of regional restrictions (based on Rt) 
of the 7-th of January 2021. Rates increased up after the school's opening in January 2021. 
The proportion of detected cases strongly increased from the first to second wave (figure 2), 
where they are close to the lower bound of estimated cases (figure 3). The rate of detection 








This paper provides a comprehensive picture of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy of the first 
two waves (February/2020- February/2021) and its relationship with non-pharmaceutical 
health policies adopted by the Government. 
 
Lethality 
Virus lethality was different between the first and the second wave. Suitable infection fatality 
ratios were %"#(.;) = 2.53% within the first wave and %"#(.H) = 1.15% within the second 
one. From the 19-th of July to the 17-th of November 2020 an %"#8 = 2.53% overestimates 
the actual one (figure 2). In March and April 2020, hospitals in most affected areas were 
quickly overloaded causing an increase of 40% of deaths for any cause in Italy (for the same 
months of 2015-2019) [26]. Furthermore, in Lombardy (the epicenter of the first wave) 
nursing homes were used as hospitals support resulting in unprecedented mortality among 
their residents [27,28]. The lethality excess of COVID19 in the first wave (figure 1) is in line 
with the mortality excess of deaths for any cause in the same period. An %"#8=1.15% is not 
consistent with observed data from the 8-th of August to the 4-th of September (figure 2), a 
lower one seems to be more suitable.  This can be also seen by the ISS estimates of quartiles 
of time to death distribution in the summer period (table 1), which are strongly affected by 
imported cases for summer holidays and younger age of infected people. Cases were mostly 
detected at airports and seaside and the mean age of infected people decreased under 30 years 
[24,29]. After the peak of the second wave (from the 14-th of November 2020) %"#8=2.53% 
was no longer inconsistent with data, supporting the assumption that hospitals overload 
(caused by COVID-19 incidence peaks) is associated with higher mortality. To keep the 
%"#8 	below 1.15%, authorities could daily look for more than 87 cases per death. Detecting 
less could mean that asymptomatic people were not quarantined or that infection was 
spreading in populations at higher risk of death (for example nursing homes). A reasonable 
warning event to introduce further restriction measures could be to find less than 56 cases per 
death, which corresponds to the lower bound of infections per death one should expect under 
the assumption of an effective health system (table 1 of supplemental material, last row). 
Moreover, health authorities could use table 1 of supplemental materials to estimate expected 






The higher lethality of the first wave is associated with a lesser daily average number of 
performed tests (43,503 vs 143,854). Testing infections contacts to find and quarantine 
asymptomatic people helped to reduce the infection fatality rate in the second wave by 
reducing the number of transmissions chains in populations and the resulting hospitals' 
burden. Restrictions of population mobility were always followed by a time-trend inversion 
(from increasing to decreasing) of death and incidence curves and shorter lag-times (from 
actions to expected effects) were associated with stronger policies (figures 1,3). If not 
introduced gradually (e.g., incentives to in-store shopping), removals of mobility restrictions 
were followed by an increment in curves rates. Strong and concentrated restrictions to 
mobility followed by their gradual removal are associated with a steeper wave, while gradual 
restrictions to mobility followed by a sudden removal are associated with a fatter wave. The 
lockdown of industrial production (2020/03/23) seems to have had a light additional effect on 
previous measures. Specific measures on student mobility are associated with changes in 
curves rates. Presumably, students flow could affect the virus spread by increasing inter-
household contacts [30]. Since children and young people are often asymptomatic, less 
inclined than adults to social distancing, and more intensive users of public transport, they 
could drive the virus into their house as silent spreaders. Even if the proportion of detected 
cases increased from the first to the second wave, most likely there were still many cases that 
are left out from the contact tracing system. They presumably include irregular situations but 
probably also part of asymptomatic infections among the youngest people, since the 
proportion of detected cases decreased after school closure and increased after school 
opening. Arranging test campaigns at school entrance could have several advantages, such as 
1) school would remain open and the risk of infections would be evaluable; 2) infections 




The study is based on available data which do not contain the age of death and of detected 
cases. Variables distributions by age could allow more accurate model assumptions on 
distributions of times from infection to death and diagnosis, implying better estimates and 
possibilities to make reliable predictions. However, we run the analysis with several 
assumptions about the range of possible values of a function (7) and the results are robust (the 
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A reasonable infection fatality ratio of the SARS-COV-2 in high-income countries is 1.15%. 
Peaks in daily incidence (causing hospitals overload) are associated with possible higher 
infection fatality rates. Italian COVID-19 first wave was characterized by a lethality higher 
than the high-income countries average (2.53% vs 1.15%) probably due to the health system 
capacity saturation. The development of contact system tracing slowed the virus spread in the 
second wave and resulted in shortened periods of hospitals overload and lower lethality. The 
detection of at least 87 cases per death could be a useful cut-off for controlling virus spread 
and lethality. The detection of fewer than 56 cases per death could be a reasonable warning 
event to evaluate further restrictions measures. Restrictions on population mobility are 
effective within a suppression strategy. Removal of restrictions should be implemented by 
sequential steps for avoiding a quick rising of incident cases. Test campaigns could be 
organized at the entrance of schools, to block (at least in part) infections outside, to measure 
the risk of infection in a specific school (and activate/increase distance learning if needed), 
and to assess the national incidence among younger ages. Making all data publicly available 
would increase the support from all researchers.  
 
Significance for public health 
The COVID-19 pandemic posed important challenges to public health institutions. All around 
the world, countries experimented with severe and unprecedented measures of containment, 
which strongly restricted people's mobility. To provide quantitative measures about the effects 
of the adopted public health policies on the virus spread and lethality is an important step for 
controlling the pandemic. 
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Table 1. Crude and adjusted1 ISS quartiles of conditional times from symptoms to diagnosis 
of and death with COVID-19, by three pandemic periods. Italy, December 2020. 
Period 
Time to diagnosis  Time to death 






































































1ISS estimates were adjusted to obtain corresponding parameters estimates of conditional times from infection to diagnosis and death. Data 
from https://www.epicentro.iss.it/coronavirus/sars-cov-2-decessi-italia#8  
2 YBI = Youle-Bowley index of asymmetry. It ranges in [-1,1] and is equal to 0 in case of symmetry.  












Table 2. 1-week variation of curve of deaths with COVID-19 by infection day before and 
after most important health policies. Italy, March/2020-February/2021. 
Wave Measure date 
Daily average variation of 
deaths during one week 
Relative 
difference 
(%) before after 
1 School closed  2020/03/05 27.25 13.9 -49 
1 Stop mobility  2020/03/12 13.9 -2.78 -120 
1 Industrial lockdown 2020/03/23 -9.3 -13.38 -44 
1 intraregional mobility 2020/05/17 -3.69 -2.64 28 
1 free mobility  2020/04/06 -2.23 -1.63 27 
2 
School opening in 14 
regions 
2020/09/14 
0.96 2.33 143 
2 
School opening in 
remaining 6 regions 
2020/09/24 
3.35 7.02 110 
2 
Several restrictions 
(including 75% DAD 
high school) 
2020/10/24 
20.3 17.17 -15 
2 
Regional restrictions 
according to Rt 




2020/12/08 -8.24 -3.83 54 
2 
No mobility between 
regions 
2020/12/20 -1.23 -0.04 97 
2 
No mobility but 1 
visit per day to 
parents within 
municipalities 
2020/12/24 -0.14 -1.26 -800 
2 
Regional restrictions 
according to Rt 
2010/01/07 -3.51 -5.55 -58 
2 
High School opening 
(50-75% in presence) 
in 8 regions1 
2010/01/18 -6.07 -5.94 2 
2 
High School opening 
(50-75% in presence) 
in 8 regions 
2010/01/25 -5.94 -3.81 36 
2 
High School opening 
(50-75% in presence) 
in 8 regions 
2010/02/01 -4.06 -1.72 58 
1Trentino opened high school on 7-th of January; Abruzzo, Tuscany and Aosta Valley opened the 11-th of January. I aggregated those 
openings to the 18-th of January in order to evaluate the weekly rate. 
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Fig 3 Estimated Incidence curve of COVID-19 infections. Italy, February 2020 – February 2021. 
 
